Supreme Court Rejects Heightened Burden for “Reverse Discrimination” Plaintiffs in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services
By: Mark I. Pinkert and Abigail Putnam
On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, resolving a circuit split over so-called “reverse discrimination” cases in which a member of a “majority” group (i.e., straight, white, male, etc.) alleges that he or she was treated unfairly based on majority characteristics. The Sixth Circuit, along with four other circuits, had imposed additional pleading burdens on reverse discrimination claimants suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. But the Supreme Court reversed and held that plaintiffs in those types of cases are subject to the same litigation burdens as minorities suing for discrimination. This decision—and the Court’s unanimity—sends an important signal to lower courts, not just in reverse discrimination cases but potentially in DEI-related cases more broadly.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.” Typically, a plaintiff can state a prima facie claim for disparate treatment by showing that she applied for position for which she was qualified but was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. However, some lower courts had held that, in reverse discrimination cases, the plaintiff is required to come forward with additional “background circumstances” that show the defendant is an “unusual employer” that discriminates against majority groups.
In this case, Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, was hired for a position at the Ohio Department of Youth Services. After Ginine Trim, a gay woman, became her new supervisor, Ames was demoted, and a younger gay man was hired to replace her. Ames sued for discrimination based on her sexual orientation and sex. The district court and the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint because Ames failed identify any other “background circumstances” that demonstrated her employer discriminated against heterosexual women.
In a short, unanimous decision, penned by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the Supreme Court reversed. It held that the “additional circumstances” test does not comport with the plain text of Title VII, which draws no distinction between majority- and minority-group plaintiffs. Instead, the statute prohibits discrimination against “any individual”—a plain-text understanding reinforced by Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch concurred separately to criticize judge-made rules and standards in the discrimination context, where courts are ill-equipped to play favorites among vaguely defined racial “groups,” and where they have no statutory authority to do so anyway. Further, Justice Thomas opined that the Court’s entire McDonnell Douglas three-part, burden-shifting framework lacks basis in the statutory text of Title VII and is difficult to apply. Justice Thomas advised lower courts that the framework is not required and that courts can proceed in Title VII cases without it, while he also invited litigants to challenge that framework in the future.
Employers should be aware of this case and its impact on Title VII litigation going forward. In short, employers should be wary of anti-majority discrimination (if they were not already), because reverse discrimination lawsuits will now be easier to bring, at least in the circuits that had previously imposed a heightened burden. More broadly, this decision seems to highlight the illegality of certain DEI policies and practices in corporate America. By emphasizing the plain meaning of “any individual” in the statute, Justice Jackson seemed to reiterate that Title VII prohibits all forms of race, gender, or religious-based discrimination, regardless of the employers’ belief that anti-majority discrimination is justified by history or social policy.
