New Bill Would Reshape New York Independent Expenditure Committee Obligations, Sharply Increases Penalties
By: Joseph T. Burns and Eitan Genger
On July 15, 2026, New York State Senator Andrew Gounardes introduced S.10663, a bill that would amend the definition of independent expenditures (“IE”), broaden disclosure requirements for independent expenditure committees, increase public and private enforcement powers eliminate defenses to penalties, and sharply increase penalties for noncompliance.
The bill expands the definition of a regulated independent expenditure. Current Election Law reaches, within sixty days before a general or special election (or thirty days before a primary), a communication that “includes or references a clearly identified candidate.” S.10663 would preserve that clause and add two additional triggers within the pre-election window. The first captures a communication that uses “such candidate’s name, voice, likeness, or another descriptor that would be understood by a reasonable viewer to refer to such candidate.” The second, more sweeping addition captures a communication that, “regardless of whether [the communication] identifies or references a clearly identified candidate, uses language or imagery substantially associated with a candidate’s campaign, platform, background, or publicly stated positions, such that a reasonable viewer would understand the communication as designed to influence the outcome of such general, special, or primary election.” The sponsor’s memo describes these additions as intended to “close recently exploited loopholes that allow IE committees to escape the intent of the law.” The practical result is that communications currently treated as issue advocacy (and not considered independent expenditures), including thematic ads that never name or depict a candidate, could fall within the definition of a regulated independent expenditure if a reasonable viewer would understand them as designed to influence a specific election.
The bill also restructures the civil penalty regime and removes a mental state defense. Current law imposes a civil penalty of up to $1,000 on any person who “knowingly” misidentifies or fails to identify an independent expenditure as required by § 14-107(2). S.10663 divides the penalty into two tiers. In the ordinary tier, new § 14-126(3)(a) strikes the word “knowingly” and raises the cap from $1,000 to $1,000,000 per day for the violation, or the cost of the communication, whichever is greater. In the willful tier, new § 14-126(3)(b) sets a cap of $5,000,000 per day for knowing and willful violations, again subject to a cost-of-communication floor. Because the ordinary tier no longer requires knowledge, an IE committee could be liable for the base penalty without any showing that it knew of the misidentification or omission. A parallel amendment to New York City Charter § 1052(a)(15)(d)(i) raises the municipal civil penalty from $10,000 to $1,000,000 per day.
New injunctive authority is added as well. The bill would empower the State Board of Elections Chief Enforcement Counsel to “pursue injunctive relief to enjoin an unlawful disclosure or communication,” and a parallel provision of the New York City Charter grants the NYC Campaign Finance Board the same authority for violations of the City’s disclosure requirements. Under current law, enforcement occurs primarily after the fact through civil penalty proceedings. These provisions would allow regulators to seek to stop an allegedly noncompliant communication while it is still running rather than address it exclusively through post-hoc penalty assessments, meaning an advertisement could be taken down on the eve of an election.
A new private cause of action would also be created. The bill would permit an individual injured by a knowing and willful misidentification or a failure to identify an independent expenditure to sue for “actual damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, reasonable attorneys fees and costs, and other such remedies as a court may deem appropriate.” The proposal would allow for the awarding of punitive damages, which are not commonly available under New York campaign finance provisions. The private cause of action is limited to the willful tier, so it does not attach to ordinary strict-liability violations of § 14-126(3)(a). It does, however, mean that where knowing and willful conduct is alleged, a committee could face both a state enforcement proceeding and a private suit arising from the same communication.
New York City’s “Top Three Donors” disclosure for independent expenditures is materially rewritten as well. This disclosure requirement applies to entities which make independent expenditures. On the definitional side, the bill adds defined terms for “direct donor,” “political committee,” and “political action committee,” cross-referenced to Election Law § 14-100. On the operative side, the bill provides that where a top three donor to the disclosing entity is itself a political committee or PAC, the communication must then list the top three donors to that committee. If a top donor to that committee is also a political committee or PAC, the communication must list that committee’s top donors, “and so on and so forth, until the donors of all such political committees or political action committees are listed in the manner required herein for direct donors.” The recursive rule applies to written communications, television and internet video advertisements, and radio and internet audio advertisements, in each case tied to donors who contributed at least $5,000 in the twelve months preceding the election.
For independent expenditure committees registered in New York, S.10663 would dramatically change day-to-day operations along several lines. Communications planning would need to account for the possibility that thematic or issue-focused messaging within the pre-election window could be captured by the expanded definition, particularly under the “substantially associated” prong. Disclosure workflows for New York City ad placements would need to accommodate upstream donor tracing sufficient to populate the recursive “Top Three Donors” disclosure. Compliance protocols would need to be tightened given the removal of the “knowingly” element from the base penalty, because even a good-faith misidentification would no longer be a defense at that tier. And exposure modeling for potential violations would need to reflect penalties assessed per day rather than per violation, along with the possibility of a live injunction and, in willful cases, a private suit seeking punitive damages.
The bill has been referred to the State Senate Rules Committee and, as of this writing, has not been introduced in the Assembly. Because the Legislature adjourned its regular session in June, action in 2026 is unlikely. The bill could, however, be taken up by the newly elected Legislature when it convenes in January 2027.
